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POWER POLITICS AND THE RULE OF LAW:
PROFESSOR SCHWARZENBERGER RECONSIDERED
Robert A. Friedlander*
Professor Friedlander utilizes the literature of Georg Schwarzenberger
to present his views on the contemporary status of international law in the
maintenance of world public order. At the same time Schwarzenberger's
position is reconsidered in the light of the awakening interest in interna-
tional criminal law and the growing threat of international terrorism.
Friedlander warns against the continuing powerlessness of the United Na-
tions and joins his senior colleague in calling for a world federal order.
Intertwined in this analysis are the recurring problems which lawyers and
jurists encounter in the principles announced at Nuremberg.
SSUME that a group of well armed gangsters resolve to estab-
lish themselves as a ruling class and to impose their authority
over a helpless people. They seize control of the national de-
cision-making apparatus, take over the key administrative posts and
the judiciary, expropriate the most desirable real property, regulate
education, and abolish the right to political association and free ex-
pression. A new philosophy of racial superiority is introduced which
promotes international conquest. The ideal of justice is replaced by
the doctrine of strength, and law becomes the exercise of power.
This paradigm, based on the Nazi experience of the 1930's, is used
by Professor Georg Schwarzenberger to introduce the first of two
volumes of collected papers covering the post-Second World War era
and dealing with the problems and prospects of international law.1
The central underlying theme of almost all his work for the past four
* Associate Professor of International Law, Lewis University College of Law;
Co-Director, Lewis University Center for International Criminal Justice Studies; Lec-
turer, School for New Learning, DePaul University. Ph.D., Northwestern Univer-
sity; J.D., DePaul University College of Law.
The author is indebted to Professor Schwarzenberger for furnishing a copy of his
most recent work, Civitas Maxima?, 29 Y.B. WORLD AFFAIRs 337 (1975), which ap-
peared after this analysis was at press. The aforementioned article provides an excel-
lent synthesis of many of Schwarzenberger's ideas which have been propounded over
the last thirty years. The analysis presented below also applies to this latest study.
1. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 11-13 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as FRONTIERS].
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decades is that "power politics and war are inevitable consequences of
the organisation of international society on the basis of sovereign
States and empires .. ."I Humankind, according to Schwarzenber-
ger, has developed three basic patterns of law, power, coordination,
and reciprocity. 3 The delicate balance between them has determined
the substantive content of both municipal and international law. In
the last analysis, however, it is the Hobbesian view of the world that
predominates.4
With respect to the functioning of society, either national or inter-
national, power is thus the overriding consideration. A recurrent
theme throughout Professor Schwarzenberger's postwar studies is that
international law has become "merely power politics in disguise. ' 5
The principles and precepts of international law, whether by custom
or by treaty, have only had a limited effect in the world political
arena.6 In fact Schwarzenberger seems to reinforce the similar view-
point of his American counterpart, Hans Morgenthau, that from the
dawn of humanity to the post-Second World War era, force has been
both the ends and means of national foreign policy. 7 Admittedly, this
reasoning amounts almost "to a counsel of despair," for in accordance
with this theory, the international community possesses no effective
2. Id. at 3,12. Cf. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 169
(1971) [hereinafter cited as LAW AND ORDER], wherein the author lists "[a]rmed con-
flict, violence and the breakdown of law and order" as being descriptive of many of
the most notable events of the contemporary world. See also G. SCHWARZENBERGER,
POWER PoLITIcs: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2d rev. ed. 1951) [hereinafter
cited as POWER POLITICS], G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,(4th ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL]; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND TOTALITARIAN LAWLESSNESS (1943); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER (1936).
3. FRONTIERS at 16, 25-36.
4. See T. HOBBES, LEvLATHAN 124 (Collier ed. 1962): "[1]aw, properly, is the
word of him, that by right hath command over others." Hobbes also postulated the
necessity of the state in order to define the normative standards of conduct. See also
Friedrich, Thomas Hobbes-Myth Builder of the Modern World, 3 J. Soc. PHIL.(1938).
5. See, e.g., FRONTIERS at 24, 29, 156, 241-42, 290; LAW AND ORDER at 19, 22,
25, 74, 281; POWER POLITICS at 14, 148, 261 et seq.; I MANUAL at 10, 118, 179, 356,
368.
6. 1 MANUAL at 382.
7. See H. MORGENTHAU, A NEW FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES 208
(1969). The predominance of the national interest over everything else is a favorite
theme of Professor Morgenthau. See especially H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG
NATIONS (4th ed. 1967); H. MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST(1951).
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enforcement sanctions and cannot adequately fulfill its peace-keeping
obligations.8
Despite the careful use of language and the formal legal terminolo-
gy employed (including many Latin maxims), Professor Schwarzen-
berger's world-view is basically a hostile one. It is partly one of
frustration and partly one of disillusionment. Neither the statesman
nor the scholar, he argues, can "set out an objective and, at the same
time, refuse to contemplate the means by which it can. best be
attained." Therefore, power politics remains the lot of humanity.9
Nonetheless, international law still operates more or less as a legal
system within certain identifiable perimeters. These are the frontiers
of international law, and they include: the law of peace, the law of
armed warfare, the law of international institutions, the law of jus
cogens (binding international law, i.e., treaties), and the law of
sovereignty. 10 However, the prevailing system of international law, in
all its facets, is still deemed by Professor Schwarzenberger to be a
"quasi-order. . . of power politics in disguise.""
The key to the entire Schwarzenberger analysis is power. Power is
the determining factor in the formation of the international hierarchy
of nations which are now divided into world powers, middle powers
and small states. "The essence of power is the ability to exercise
compelling pressure irrespective of its reasonableness. Neverthe
less, if international law is to have any meaning, good faith and
consent are necessary to its operation. There must still be rules to the
game, no matter how the game is ultimately played.' 3 In the words of
Professor Julius Stone, "the illusory choice between Power Politics
and World Community does in fact deprive all human beings of any
8. LAW AND ORnmR at 166.
9. 1 MANUAL at 375. But cf. J. BRImRLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 55-56 (6th ed.
H. Waldock 1963), which claims that one must nevertheless believe that reason pre-
dominates and that "order and not chaos is the governing principle of the world.
10. Cf. especially FRONTImERS, chs. 9-12; LAw AND ORDER, chs. 4-5, 9-10.
11. LAW AND ORDER at 25. Contra, C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 229 (2d rev. ed. 1963): "[a]n eventual world law within
the framework of a world constitution seems therefore to be quite in line with the
progressive realization of the task which law as the realization of justice presents to
mankind."
12. FRONTIMRS at 22.
13. Id. at 78, 157, 295, 299; LAW AND ORDER at 269; 1 MANUAL, ch. 6.
[Vol. 24:836
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constructive role, however small, in the struggle for peace."'14 An
alternative to the politics of power must exist in the international
arena if the world community is to survive. Value oriented systems
involving the concepts of human dignity and human rights are basic
to the survival of world public order.15
The traditional notions of international law, according to Schwar-
zenberger, are based upon the distinction between the law of peace
and the law of war,'" although the twentieth century can be mostly
characterized as being subjected to a state of status mixtus.' 7 This
uncertain condition has necessarily affected the legitimization of both
jural agencies and jural activities, and has, thereby, increased the
tendencies of nation states "towards subjectivism and an unscrupu-
lous abuse of terms.""' The result has been a century of crises and
conflict, and even at times chaos, which often operates beyond the
effective controls of international law. The historian and former
diplomat, George Kennan, has stated the problem boldly and bluntly:
"[t]he mark of a genuine concern for the observation of the legal
principle in the affairs of nations is a recognition of the realistic limits
beyond which the principle cannot be pressed."' 9
Professor Schwarzenberger is more than a mere political analyst
writing within the constraints of a legal system, however imperfect.
He is also a legal philosopher dedicated to the principles and the
precepts of the rule of law. Any definition of law he insists, must
include those norms established on a basis of either consent or
compulsion. World order operates by means of a metalegal apparatus
of force and power. World society, as distinct from international
society (trans-national society) is a combination of disintegration,
expansion, and centralization. Order almost invariably controls the
legal superstructure: the greater the control, the greater the need for
legitimization. Thus, the exact relation between law and order and a
legal system depends upon the legitimization of that system's social
14. See J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT xxxix (1954).
15. See M. McDoUGAL AND ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 246
(1960). See also P. CORBETT, THE GROWTH OF WORLD LAW 176-85 (1971).
16. FRONTIERS, ch. 10.
17. id. at 250-54; LAW AND ORDER at 17; 1 MANUAL at 174.
18. FRONTIERS at 255; cf. 1 MANUAL at 178-81.
19. G. KENNAN, REALITIES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 39 (1954).
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infrastructure and the community character of specific group rela-
tions. 20 However, all of these variants share one common denomina-
tor; they are not capable of actual realization or effective implementa-
tion without the motivating force of power politics.2 By themselves,
excluding the politics of power, all legal systems whether national or
international are mere utopias. "Thus, international law can do little
more than offer the alternative of a set of optional standards of a
legally binding character higher than those ordinarily practised in a
system of power politics. ' 22
Contrast this with the realist approach of the noted French philoso-
pher and political commentator, Raymond Aron, who postulates that
it is difficult to conceive of a juridical order that does not prohibit its
subjects from becoming a law unto themselves and pursuing an
exclusive world-view of raison d'gtat. A global society, he argues
requires a moral unity and solidarity of outlook. There must be a
kinship of ideals if humanity is to survive, and nation-states must
agree to submit their external conduct to the rule of law.2 Hence,
avoidance of force becomes a necessary concomitant of the conditions
of justice. "In the long run you cannot expect one without the
other."24
But, how did international law originate? And of what does it
actually consist? Rudimentary systems of international law have exist-
ed from the dawn of recorded history, although the growth and
development of modern international society is a direct result of the
disintegration and reformulation of the precepts and principles of the
Roman Empire and the Medieval Christian commonwealth. Modern
international law is therefore primarily of Western origin. "The condi-
tions on which the rise of international law depends were first fulfilled
by the Italian city States and the independent States on the fringe of
the Holy Roman Empire."25 From the Peace of Westphalia of 1648,
international relations has operated within a framework of multi-
20. Cf. FRONTIERs at 22-36, 43-44; LAw AND ORDER at 10-15.
21. LAW AND ORDER at 25.
22. POWER POLmcs at 253; but see STONE, supra note 14, at xxxiv-xli.
23. R. ARON, PEACE AND WAR 717, 725-36 (1966).
24. Speech of Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, quoted in BRIERLY, supra
note 9, at 432; cf. M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 354 (1961).
25. POWER PoLrrIcs at 29; cf. FRONTIERS at 1, 43-57; 1 MANUAL at 4-7.
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lateral treaties and on legal principles designed to make sovereignty
the exclusive measuring rod of international personality. By the twen-
tieth century international law had become the law of sovereign
nation-states.2" However, international law is at best a quasi-interna-
tional order. While universal, exclusive and individualistic, it is, most
of all, dependent upon treaties, custom and the general principles
enunciated by civilized nations seeking to legitimize their functions
within a world political process.2 7
The key to Schwarzenberger's analysis may be found in his treat-
ment of the nature of sovereignty. According to Thomas Hobbes,
might makes sovereign authority, for "[wlhere there is no common
power, there is no law. .. ."8 Applying the Hobbesian approach to
the twentieth century, Schwarzenberger sees international customary
law as resting upon the axis of the rule of force. The concept of
sovereignty in contemporary international law supervenes the United
Nations Charter, undermines general international obligations, and
minimizes the requirements of good faith, consent, and national
responsibility. For all intents and purposes the great powers are above
the dictates of the international legal system and have often acted in
total disregard of the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations. Sovereignty itself is both legal and political, absolute and
relative. If not limited by treaty or established custom, a nation-state
is free to do what it likes, and each sovereign polity may be consid-
ered supreme within its own jurisdiction. In fact, during the interwar
period, the totalitarian states so glaringly abused their domestic sover-
eign authority that the standard of civilization almost vanished alto-
gether.2 9
The principle of the equality of nation-states is a complementary
aspect of state sovereignty. But since international society is stratified
into hierarchies of powers, sovereignty still translates into pre-emi-
nence or predominant leadership and, perhaps, omnipotence (a con-
26. FRONTIERS at 57, 96.
27. LAW AND ORDER, ch. 3; 1 MANUAL at 7 et seq. For a more traditional and
optimistic approach cf. BmRILY, supra note 9, at 1-25, 41-56; 1 D. O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-6 (2d ed. 1970); J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 1-22, 32-33 (7th ed. 1972).
28. HOBBES, supra note 4, at 101; see also id., ch. 20.
29. Cf. LAW AND ORDER, ch. 5; FRONTIERS at 25, 299; PowER POLITICS, ch. 5;
1 MANUAL at 13-14, 58-59.
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dition which is not totally incompatible with the Charter of the United
Nations). 30 The distinguished political scientist Stanley Hoffman
echoes these sentiments, defining international law as the reflection of
power relations which leaves sovereignty intact or submits the sover-
eignty of a given state to restrictions imposed on that same state by
the greater force of its combined enemies." Sovereignty, in Schwar-
zenberger's international construct, is either relative or absolute. The
various stages of sovereignty can be tabulated in the following man-
ner: (1) absolute supremacy and independence; (2) relative inde-
pendence; (3) inter-dependence; (4) relative dependence; (5) abso-
lute subjugation and dependence. The precarious nature of legal
sovereignty as it exists in international law, and the theory of "sover-
eign equality" as enunciated in the United Nations Charter, are only
meaningful within the broader divisions of political sovereignty in the
space and nuclear age."
In the last analysis, international customary law is subordinate to
the rule of force, and the new Leviathans, or super powers, are
capable of crushing resistance to their authority with impunity (al-
though the experience of the United States in Southeast Asia may call
this view into question). The concept of sovereignty is basic to the
international state system. And it has not been uncommon for a
twentieth century super power to place itself above the law."1 But,
international jurisprudence has long recognized that "no State can,
without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other
States either to mediation or to arbitration; or to any other kind of
pacific settlement.' 4
30. See POWER POLITICS at 37-38; 1 MANUAL at 58-60. See also H. ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDITION 234 (1958): "[S]overeignty, the ideal of uncompromising self-
sufficiency and mastership, is contradictory to the very condition of plurality." Cf.
I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 280-90 (2d ed. 1973), for
a more traditional viewpoint.
31. See, e.g., Hoffman, An Evaluation of the United Nations, 22 Omo STATE L.J.
462 (1961).
32. LAW AND ORDER at 65-66. See also FRONTIERS at 25, 299-300; but see G.
TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (W. Butler transl. 1975): "since
Schwarzenberger recognizes that principles of the United Nations Charter have be-
come virtually universal, then according to his conception the operative sphere of
these old norms is severely limited."
33. LAW AND ORDER at 63-66.
34. Advisory Opinion on Eastern Carelia Case, P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5, 27 (1923).
[Vol. 24:836
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The exercise of sovereignty can be either positive or negative. Since
sovereignty is power, positive sovereignty represents the complete
subjugation of the individual to the state and is primarily domestic in
its focus. If there existed a world authority structure, then positive
sovereignty could be defined as the supremacy of a universal state
organism over a plurality of political entities. Negative sovereignty
specifically describes the operation of law, or lack of it, in the
contemporary world. It may be defined as the "non-recognition of
any superior authority," and thus implies the unlimited freedom of
the national polity in the international arena. The significance of
negative sovereignty is that it "constitutes a potent guarantee of the
supremacy of the rule of force over the rule of law in international
relations."3 5
One hundred years ago the English positivist and legal philosopher,
John Austin, claimed that either "[e]very supreme government is free
from legal restraints; or . . . every supreme government is legally
despotic."3" The influence of Austin on Schwarzenberger is evident,37
and, though the latter seemingly refutes Austin's denial of the exist-
ence of an international law,3" Schwarzenberger's own world-view is
equally harsh. International relations is pure power politics "in which
groups consider themselves to be ultimate ends," and the contempo-
rary international community is merely "a system of power politics in
disguise."" But even though Professor Schwarzenberger recognizes
the international realities of the twentieth century world, he too lightly
passes over the goal-setting role of legal norms. The unarticulated
issue is whether or not an international legal system can exist without
the command influence of a universal political authority.40
Sir Hartley Shawcross, Chief British Prosecutor at the Nuremberg
Trials, drew a careful distinction in his closing argument between a
state's obligations and a state's power. "Legal purists," he declared,
35. LAW AND ORDER at 60-62, 67-70; 1 MANUAL at 61.
36. 1 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 160 (R. Cambell ed. 1875).
37. See, e.g., LAW AND ORDER at 63-65; POWER POLITICS at 86-87, 216.
38. 1 AUSTIN, supra note 36, at 92-93, 121.
39. FRONTIERS at 24; cf. ARENDT, supra note 30, at 200, 204. Ms. Arendt main-
tains that power is what preserves the public realm.
40. See W. COPLIN, THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (1966), where
stress is placed upon the importance of "a centralized system of law-creation and law-
application."
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''may contend that nothing is law which is not imposed from above by
a sovereign body having the power to compel obedience. The idea of
analytical jurists has never been applicable to International Law."'"
Professor Schwarzenberger phrases the issue more pointedly by ask-
ing, whether there are binding norms of international law which
individual state parties (the subjects of international law) may not
modify. In other words, are there rules of world public order arising
from custom and tradition that treaties or states may not challenge?
This is the problem of international jus cogens, the denial of which
forms an essential part of Schwarzenberger's jurisprudence.42
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a per-
emptory norm of general international law. . . . a peremptory norm of
general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the in-
ternational community of states as a whole as a norm from which no dero-
gation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character.
48
Moreover, a treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm
which becomes established after said treaty enters into force.44 Thus,
to quote Professor Ian Brownlie, the doctrine of jus cogens refers to
"rules of customary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or
acquiescence but only by the formation of a subsequent rule of
contrary effect."' 45 In order to concede the universal application of
this doctrine, Schwarzenberger would have to admit that contempo-
rary international law is a fully operative legal system and this he
staunchly refuses to do. Instead, he maintains that unorganized inter-
41. Quoted in Paulson, Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg, 4 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFAIRS 132, 144 (1975).
42. The following discussion is based on LAw AND ORDER, ch. 5; 1 MANUAL at
24-26, 59-60, 101-02, 150-51.
43. Art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, May 23, 1969, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875,
891 (1969).
44. Art. 64, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, May 23, 1969. For an analysis of
the Vienna Convention see Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 495 (1970).
45. BROWNLIE, supra note 30, at 499-500. While there is disagreement among
most legal analysts as to just what norms are universally recognized, the more promi-
nent possibilities include the law of genocide; the prohibition of aggressive war; the
prohibition of racial discrimination; war crimes; the prohibition of slavery and the
outlawry of piracy. It is possible that the principle of self-determination and the
right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources may also be included. For
further discussion see id. at 500-03.
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national society (pre-United Nations) never knew any peremptory
rules of international public policy and that contemporary interna-
tional law is derived from a de facto world public order or quasi-
order. Thus, there exists only a rudimentary legal system based upon
more or less effective multilateral or consensual peace settlements.
Schwarzenberger's leading critic with respect to the principle of jus
cogens, Professor Alfred Verdross, takes strong exception to this
position. Beginning with the basic argument that in the field of
international law there are rules having the character of jus cogens,
Verdross emphatically asserts that this principle governs all interna-
tional agreements. It could not be otherwise, for fundamental princi-
ples and universal norms require good faith among nations, and
without good faith there can be no international legal system.",
Brownlie, although admitting that prevailing international law is
decentralized at best and lacks any significant enforcement proce-
dures, nonetheless refers to certain "overriding principles" of interna-
tional law. Noting the fact that Schwarzenberger considers the princi-
ple of jus cogens as a source of instability in treaty relations, Brownlie
also raises the interesting question of whether one aspect of the
principle, such as crimes against humanity, is more important than
another, such as the controversial "right" of self-determination. And
what of the jurisdictional problems involved?4 7 Schwarzenberger
draws attention to the basic contradictions inherent in a doctrine
binding sovereign states as to whether those same peremptory norms
derive their authority from a compulsion which does not exist or from
consent which is another area of international law with its own
principles and law creating processes.48 He therefore concludes that
"[i]nternational customary law does not know of any corresponding
international jus cogens and must resign itself to the supremacy of the
rule of force in international relations."49
If this is so, then a subordinate if nonetheless significant issue is
46. See Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM.
J. INT'L L. 55 (1966).
47. See BROWNLIE, supra note 30, ch. 22. For an extensive analysis of whether
self-determination actually represents a principle or right see Friedlander, Self-
Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry, 1 DET. C.L. REV. 71 (1975).
48. 2 MANUAL at 398. See also 1 MANUAL at 8-9, 116-17, 138-40, 150-51; LAw
AND ORDER at 30-33.
49. LAW AND ORDER at 63.
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whether or not international law recognizes any rules parallel to those
of municipal law which support a theory of international criminal
law. The answer is an emphatic no. One cannot find evidence, he
argues, for the existence of a universal criminal justice as part of
established customary international law." The very term international
criminal law, according to Professor Schwarzenberger, has at least six
different meanings: the territorial scope of municipal criminal law,
internationally prescribed municipal criminal law, internationally au-
thorized municipal criminal law, municipal criminal law common to
civilized nations, international cooperation in the administration of
municipal criminal justice, and criminal law in the material sense of
the word. Peremptorily omitting piracy and war crimes, long accepted
as offenses against humankind (jure gentium), Schwarzenberger fur-
ther maintains that the question as to the liability of the individual as
either the subject or the object of international law is irrelevant, if
there are no generally accepted proceedings of an international crimi-
nal character.5' For example, he insists there has not been a single
instance in which international courts or tribunals have considered an
act of state to be an international crime.52
Schwarzenberger argues that the main barrier to the recognition of
an international penal law is that sovereign nations are free to deter-
mine the territiorial scope of their municipal laws. If that freedom
were absolute, however, the result would be international chaos; thus,
in practice, conflicting claims have been reduced to manageable
proportions by the norms and conventions of customary international
law.53 As to crimes of an international character or offenses against
50. This conclusion and the analysis to follow is taken from F)RoNTIEas, ch. 8,
"The Problem of an International Criminal Law." This chapter is reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3 (G. Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965).
51. But see "Note on Piracy and Hijacking," in LAW AND ORDER at 283-84.
52. Many scholars would cite the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals
as manifestations of the opposite point of view. See also Treaty of Versailles (1919)
arts. 227-31; 2 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISToRY, 1648-1967 1389-91 (F.
Israel ed. 1967).
53. See Van Bemmelen, Reflections and Observations on International Criminal
Law, in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 77 (M. Bassiouni & V.
Nanda eds. 1973). Van Bemmelen's article is especially critical of Schwarzenberger
and stresses the need to consider human rights conventions in assessing the role of
international criminal law. See also J. STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS 303-10 (1974);
Sinha, The Position of the Individual in International Criminal Law, in 1 A TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 122 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973). Sinha
criticizes Schwarzenberger for confusing the problem of criminal conduct of individ-
[Vol. 24:836846
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the law of nations, Schwarzenberger proposes two categories of reme-
dies. The first is both original and controversial: if a state fails to
punish offenses committed against life, liberty, or property, or if the
application of its municipal criminal law falls below the minimum
standards of international society, then the home state of the victims
of the offense may hold the state of the offender liable for the
commission of an international tort. The liability for such act is
reparation made to the victims' state." The second approach is
merely the application of the commonly accepted sanctions of munici-
pal criminal law. Although there may be no individual obligation on
individual states to take a particular action, nevertheless they have the
alternative of either entering into international conventions or apply-
ing their own municipal legislation. Thus, there are alternative solu-
tions to the apparently unacceptable doctrine of an international
criminal law. Whatever the offense and whatever the customary legal
norm, Professor Schwarzenberger does not deviate from his main
theme: "in the present state of world society, international criminal
law in any true sense does not exist."55
What then of crimes of an international character of such magni-
tude that they constitute offenses against international peace or
against humanity? The unprecedented development of twentieth cen-
tury technology, plus the unparalleled orgy of destruction of two
World Wars, led to the formation of new principles concerning the
law of nations and to an expansion of existing norms derived from
"the usages established among civilised peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." 6 The Nurem-
berg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals in both their charters and their
uals with the more traditional problem of the illegal activities of states; however, the
latter claims that certain great powers have been "immune to the application of col-
lective enforcement measures . . . . [and only] paper swords of war and justice"
have been wielded against them. FRONTIERS at 208-09.
54. See also the discussion in 1 MANUAL at 162-69. Schwarzenberger divides the
remedy into three component parts: restitution, satisfaction, and compensation.
55. For opposing and equally well reasoned arguments see Stone, supra note 53,
at 301-23; Bassiouni, An Appraisal of the Growth and Developing Trends of Interna-
tional Criminal Law, 46 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 3 (1975), and the
strongly worded statement by WRIGHT, THE SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 561 (1975). There is, sur-
prisingly, no reference to the Schwarzenberger analysis in the Wright article.
56. FRoNT Rs at 78-81. The quoted phrase is taken from Para. 9 of the Pre-
amble of Hague Convention IV, October 18, 1907. Id. at 78.
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judgments expanded the generally accepted rules of international
customary law to include crimes of aggression and crimes committed
in complete disregard of the dictates of humanity. Due to the spe-
cific violations of the law of war enumerated in the charters, viola-
tions of the elementary standards of justice enunciated in the Nurem-
berg Judgment, and the United Nations General Assembly resolution
unanimously adopted on December 11, 1946, endorsing the Nurem-
berg principles, certain acts were deemed to be crimes against peace
and humanity. Thus, any member of the world community of na-
tions is henceforth estopped from asserting that these principles lack
validity under international customary law.5 7 However, Schwarzen-
berger confesses uneasiness over the application of extraordinary
jurisdiction to belligerents accused of war crimes. He maintains that.
the international military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo were
in reality joint municipal military courts rather than ad hoc interna-
tional courts and their jurisprudential legacy has been the vast en-
largement of extraordinary state jurisdiction under the municipal
criminal law. The real effect of these procedural innovations in the
law of nations is that "still tighter ropes have been drawn in advance
round the necks of the losers in any other major war."58
It has become axiomatic in the Anglo-American legal system that
hard cases make harsh law and Schwarzenberger's view of the Nu-
remberg trials reflects this position. The tribunal's reasoning, he
maintains, was not based on the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations. Neither the laws of war nor international custom-
ary practice envisaged the punishment of war crimes. They authorize,
however, the assumption of criminal jurisdiction over individuals who
have committed war crimes and who fall into the hands of their
adversaries. Under this theory, although customary international law
does not support any substantive international criminal law, it does
permit the assumption of an extraordinary form of criminal jurisdic-
tion over accused war criminals and enables them to be tried under
57. Id. at 263-73, 203-05; LAW AND ORDER at 248; 1 MANUAL at 199-200.
58. 1 MANUAL at 232-33; FRONTIERS at 205. See also id. at 269-73. For a
thoughtful contemporary reassessment of the Nuremberg trials and international law
see Paulson, supra note 41. Cf. G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 703-04
(1970), for a more critical view of the tribunal and the incisive commentary in
ARON, supra note 23, at 111-16.
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the municipal criminal law of their captors.59 If Schwarzenberger's
arguments appear somewhat tendentious, they are a necessary prereq-
uisite to his analysis of the most dramatic and significant war crimes
trial since the end of World War II, that of Adolf Eichmann.
It is the Eichmann judgment that provides the answer to the
paradigmatic problem introduced at the beginning of this study. 60
What happens when a civilized nation becomes mesmerized and is
then taken captive by a group of gangsters and madmen?61 Eichmann
symbolized the almost unimaginable barbarism of the Holocaust and
the Final Solution. His kidnapping and trial were not only national
acts of revenge and retribution, but were necessary to remind the
post-Second World War generation of the outrages and savagery of
the Third Reich. The primary objective of the Eichmann trial was to
make the young Israelis see the Holocaust in a concrete perspective.
To forget the record of the Third Reich would be synonymous with
failing to understand the challenge to the existence of civilized nations
presented by any type of racial or religious discrimination. In not
permitting the world to forget the shameful record of the Nazi terror,
the Eichmann trial "succeeded in serving the ends of justice. ' 2
Despite the underlying metalegal rationale, and even acknowledg-
ing the obvious retributive purpose, the Eichmann tribunal both
substantively and procedurally adhered to the accepted universal
standards of the rule of law. Jurisdiction over Eichmann was ulti-
mately conceded or admitted by both Argentina and West Germany,
and although Israel did not acquire an international personality until
after the Second World War, its assumption of criminal jurisdiction
was "within the limits" of the prevailing international lex lata (law in
59. FRONTIERS at 272-73; LAw AND ORDER at 247-48. For an overall critique of
the Nuremberg principles as they applied to and as they affect international law see
E. DAVIDSON, THE NUREMBERo FALLACY (1973).
60. See p. 836 supra.
61. The discussion which follows is based upon LAw AND ORDER, ch. 13, unless
otherwise noted.
62. A similar justification is put forward by the chief prosecutor in the case
against Eichmann, G. HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 447-54 (1966); see also STONE,
supra note 53, at 281-84; S. SONTAG, AGAINST INTERPRETATION AND OTHER ESSAYS
131-32 (reprinted. 1969):
The truth is that the Eichmann trial not only did not, but could not have
conformed to legal standards only ...
The function of the trial was like that of a tragic drama: above and be-
yond judgment and punishment, catharsis.
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force). 3 Determining the statute under which Eichmann had been
tried to be compatible with international law, Professor Schwarzen-
berger nevertheless places equal emphasis upon the ethical perspec-
tive of contemporary civilized standards. The defense of superior
orders, as raised by both Eichmann and the Nuremberg defendants,
is contemptuously brushed aside as representing the obedience of
mechanized barbarism. Although he admits that many of us might
not have acted so differently if placed in similar circumstances,
Schwarzenberger nonetheless concludes that both the Eichmann trial
and judgment pass the tests of international law and the standard
of civilization. As an afterthought, however, he wonders whether it
would not have been best for the Israeli court to have declared that
any punishment would have been inadequate to the nature of the
crimes committed, and that after having branded Eichmann with
"the sign of Cain," to have returned him to his homeland for what-
ever destiny his countrymen might determine. 4
Schwarzenberger is fully cognizant of the criticism that the judg-
ment was an exercise of retroactive legislation on the part of a newly
created sovereign state, a charge leveled against the Eichmann pro-
ceedings as well as against the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. His
answer is both moral and historical, though not totally satisfactory.
Under these unique circumstances, the application of retroactive
criminal law is in harmony with the international jus aequum, the
accepted customary practice where rights are relative and may be
asserted if exercised reasonably and in good faith. If the acts subject
to a retroactive statute are deemed criminal by any civilized commu-
nity, then the passing and enforcement of such retroactive legislation
is a vindication of the accepted norms of civilization and properly
subject to court jurisdiction. Thus, "from an ethical point of view, the
proceedings before the [Israeli] Court stand the test of the require-
ments of the Rule of Law." '65
63. Surprisingly, Professor Schwarzenberger does not attach great significance to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 whose signatories undertook to assume criminal
jurisdiction over war criminals, no matter what crimes had originally been committed.
See LAW AND ORDER at 243-44, 247-48.
64. Cf. the controversial analysis of Hannah Arendt in H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN
JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 232-56 (1963), which stresses the
irregularities of the trial in Jerusalem, but concurs with the capital verdict because
no person can be expected to share the earth with one who had committed such
monstrous acts.
65. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV, L. REV,
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Eichmann, the symbol of unbridled governmental terrorism in a
disordered world, has been replaced by three groups who now are the
new "dispensers" of violence: terrorists, guerrillas, and mercenaries.
All three have existed from the very beginnings of organized govern-
ment, none have secured recognition in international law, and each of
them have received considerable attention by the world community
with respect to the law of armed conflict and so-called wars of
national liberation.66 Terrorism and guerrilla warfare are inextricably
intertwined. Both consist of irregular methods of fighting, are likely
to result in criminal activities on the internal level, and may well be
considered war crimes on the international level. Terrorism thrives on
fear, uses indiscriminate force for violent objectives, and often is the
product of an individual act.67
Guerrilla warfare has become synonymous with revolutionary or-
ganization and is largely identified with irregular warfare. Terrorists
or guerrillas who operate on their own initiative during an armed con-
flict and not under identifiable, responsible superior authority are
outside the Hague and Geneva conventions and entitled at best only
to nominal protection. With respect to internal wars, when they
achieve recognition as insurgents or belligerents, guerrillas are enti-
tled to international protection, as their status is then transformed
from that of irregulars to regular combatants. But there are a grow-
ing number of situations in which an internal rebellion may also be a
de facto or de jure armed conflict, such as in Biafra and Viet-Nam.
Since the United Nations has taken the position in numerous General
Assembly resolutions that wars of national liberation are in effect
international conflicts, Schwarzenberger argues that world order has
become the loser. The United Nations attitude mocks one of the rules
of classic international law. Likewise the U.N. declaration that the
use of mercenaries against national liberation and independence
movements is a criminal act, and that mercenaries must be considered
593, 618-20 (1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 648-61 (1958). In these companion articles two distin-
guished legal philosophers support, from different perspectives, the concept of retro-
active legislation as a reasonable prophylactic applied to a community in which law
had ceased to rule.
66. The following analysis is taken from LAW AND ORDER, ch. 12.
67. See generally INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 5-64 (M.
Bassiouni ed. 1975); E. WALTER, TERROR AND RESISTANCE: A STUDY OF POLITICAL
VIOLENCE 3-55 (1969); R. Moss, THE WAR FOR THE CITIES 17-38 (1972).
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as outlaws, is a dangerous and catastrophic "reform" of international
legal norms, and another milestone on the road towards violence in
the world societal structure.
If contemporary international law continues to operate as mere
quasi-order, and if power politics and armed conflict are still the
hallmarks of organized international society, then what hope is there
for a rational and relatively stable world order? In Professor Schwar-
zenberger's pessimistic and fundamentally harsh analysis the answer
is obvious. Unless there is an assimilation or integration of existing
sovereign political entities into a world federation, and unless vested
and parochial national interests are discarded in favor of mutual
interdependence and international collaborative enterprise, the rule of
might makes right will replace the rule of law. The failure to
develop a federal framework of world society and world law has
already resulted in growing concentrations of power that menace the
very survival of the international state system.38
68. FRONTIERS at 300-13; 1 MANUAL at 365-82; POwER PoLrTIcs at 804-06.
Writing in 1961 as a political scientist, Secretary of State Kissinger declared:
Our margin of survival has narrowed dangerously. But we still do have a
margin. The possibility of choice remains. . . . The prerequisite, how-
ever, is that we give up our illusions. We are not omnipotent. We are no
longer invulnerable. The easy remedies have been thought of. We must
be prepared to face complexity.
H. KIssINGER, THE NEcEssITY FOR CHOICE: PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY 2 (1961). It is a warning that has not lost its urgency for either world poli-
tics or the rule of law.
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